Abstract Summary
Designed to study earthquakes, seismographs was from the beginning of the 20th century installed across the globe. In the 1950s it became clear that global seismic monitoring was the most reliable method to detect underground nuclear tests. In 1961, M. Ewing of Columbia University was contacted by E. Savarensky of the Institute of Physics of the Earth, Moscow, who suggested that the two institutions exchanged seismographs on a scientific basis. The underlying interest was to gain access to the counterparty's technology to increase its own verification possibilities, a goal that could not be achieved through diplomatic channels. By making it a question of scientific knowledge sharing, Soviet scientists hoped to gain access to sensitive US technology. Before agreeing, Ewing asked permission from political and military institutions, who concurred that the exchanges were as a matter of national security that would benefit USA more than the USSR. Over the next four years, the two regularly keeping in contact and, guided by their political and military hinterland, expanding the initial scope of the exchanges to include visits of scientists and experts. At times of high tension under the Cuba Missile Crisis, both parties used third-parties’ like scientists from Denmark or international organisations like UNESCO, to further depoliticize the situation or act as a go-between. Based on material from USA, Denmark and Russia this study exam how science and scientists was used as diplomatic tools to facilitate nuclear test-ban negotiations and discuss the findings in the context of science diplomacy.
Self-Designated Keywords :
Cold War, Nuclear Teast Ban Treaty, Military funding, Seismology, Earth science