Non-Mathematical Approaches to Theoretical Biology in the Postwar Period

Over the course of the twentieth century, theoretical biology changed beyond all recognition. Although the field today is synonymous with mathematical biology, when it first emerged it had a drastically different agenda: to critically analyze the conceptual foundations of biology in order to resolve longstanding theoretical disputes and bring about the epistemic unification of biological science. The field began acquiring its now familiar mathematical character in the 1930s and 40s, as formal models became increasingly applied in different areas in biology, such as ecology and evolution. With the rise of molecular biology in the 1950s and 60s the non-formal, philosophical approach to theoretical biology that had been dominant in earlier decades came to be perceived as old-fashioned and irrelevant, if not downright pernicious. Nevertheless, a few authors attempted to rehabilitate this older tradition, arguing for the necessity of philosophical reflection about the theoretical basis of biology. This paper explores these efforts and tries to understand why they ultimately failed to convince the broader biological community about the importance of ‘doing theory’. It discusses the neglected work of Walter Elsasser, Arthur Koestler’s Albach symposium on the limits of reductionism, Conrad Waddington’s Serbelloni meetings that led to the publication of the four-volume series called Towards a Theoretical Biology, and Brian Goodwin’s challenge of the Neo-Darwinian paradigm and his unsuccessful promotion of ‘process structuralism’. Although these developments have been mostly forgotten, they are crucial for understanding how views regarding the role of theory in biology have changed in the last hundred years.