Abstract Summary
In spite of the constraints of the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly in the early Cold War, Norway and the Netherlands managed to build and operate a joint nuclear reactor by July 1951. They were the first countries to do so after the Great Powers. Their success was largely due to the combination of the strategic materials of heavy water (Norway) and uranium (the Netherlands). Nonetheless, they had to overcome significant political and technical obstacles. These existed partly because of strict secrecy policies. Diplomats and scientists in the Netherlands, Norway, Britain, France and the United States interacted to provide or sometimes prevent technical and political support. We highlight the interplay of three elements: strategic nuclear materials, the scientists’ particular transnational networks and state power politics. The transnational network of scientists and diplomats was instrumental for the Dutch-Norwegian collaboration to obtain the required support from third countries. In the end, Norway obtained important reactor design information plus reactor graphite from France. The Dutch quietly exchanged their unpurified uranium ore for ready to use British uranium fuel rods. All this eventually received the reluctant blessing of the United States. In the process, various nuclear secrets were tacitly or explicitly shared. By tracing the development of these secrets, we will show how they were co-owned by scientists and the government. This illuminates the broader co-construction of science and diplomacy.
