Abstract Summary
Focusing on the case of Greece, this paper examines the way nuclear science was introduced to developing countries during the 1950s as part of Cold War political processes. Through the Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program and before the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States sought to maintain and expand its post-war hegemonic position, restructuring Europe as a bulwark against the perceived Soviet threat. The proliferation of nuclear physics and technology, especially in the developing and contested political regions was an effective instrument of soft power to this end. In the case of Greece, the installation of the country’s first research reactor and the establishment of the nuclear center Demokritos, was a complex diplomatic affair between two unequal countries in terms of their diplomatic armamentarium. On the one hand, the United States had a well structured diplomatic activity and developed scientific capital. On the other hand, Greece was just getting out of a fierce civil war having little scientific activity and complex diplomatic practices. Thus, the process of developing the Greek nuclear program emerged as an idiosyncratic practice of science diplomacy. Significant milestones such as the Greece-US bilateral agreement or the choice of the most appropriate nuclear reactor for the newly established center were determined by individuals who took up the role of science diplomats. I argue that these individuals constituted a special kind of science diplomat who, while being neither scientists nor diplomats, acted as such determining in a decisive way the country’s scientific development.
