Technologies of Innocence and Guilt: The Introduction of New Forensic Technologies in Dutch Courtrooms

No criminal defendant, in principle, has to prove his own innocence. It is enough to sow doubt about the argument that the prosecution is making: in dubio pro reo (when in doubt, for the accused). Yet suspects and their defence attorneys frequently attempt to do just that. In their efforts they may enlist forensic technologies that are thereby presented as what one might term ‘technologies of innocence.’ Of course, these same technologies could also be turned against the defendant and thus become ‘technologies of guilt.’ This paper explores the processes by which new forensic technologies are conceptualized as ‘technologies of guilt’ and ‘technologies of innocence.’ To that end, I look at the introduction of several forensic technologies in the Dutch legal system in the twentieth century, including lie detection (briefly introduced in 1956) and DNA (first used in the Netherlands in 1988). Characterized as an inquisitorial system, which relies on supposedly ‘neutral’ court-appointed experts, the Dutch legal system might be seen as an unlikely site for such an analysis. I contend, however, that, in practice, technologies and expertise are not significantly more neutral in the Dutch inquisitorial system than in adversarial systems.